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The Role of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) in Facilitating Global 
Production Networks 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The proliferation of ‘Preferential Trade Agreements’ (PTAs) and Regional Trade Agreements 
(RTAs) in the global trading environment has significantly shaped the day-to-day conduct of 
international business transactions since the GATT formally formed five decades ago (Sally 
2008).1 Such trade agreements have rapidly spread widely throughout the world since the 
early 1990s, with the total number of PTAs in force reaching nearly 300 in 2009, up from 
around 50 in 1990. In addition, there has been a noticeably increasing number of PTA 
partners for each country; the average number of PTA partners for a given country has 
increased from 1.8 to 9.9 between 1991 and 2005 (Figure 2). PTAs in Europe and North 
America now cover almost 40% of world trade, and East Asia – the centre for global trade 
dynamics – has also found enthusiasm for bilateral PTA deals in recent years (Augier et al. 
2005). 
 
 An important parallel development in world trade is the ever-growing importance of 
the extensive form of global and regional production networks mainly driven by widespread 
operations of multinational enterprises (MNEs). Global production networks refer to the key 
growing facet of international business where MNEs vertically separate two or more stages of 
production process across two or more countries, involving extensive outsourcing and the use 
of cross-border supply chains (Jones and Kierkowski 2001). For example, Quanta Computer, 
the largest laptop original design manufacturer (ODM)2 originating in Taiwan, collects parts 
and components from around the globe – such as Intel microprocessors and Microsoft 
operating systems from the US, graphic tips designed by ATI technologies from Ontario in 
Canada, hard disc drives from Japan, and liquid crystal display (LCD) screens and memory 
chips produced from companies in Taiwan and South Korea – and then assembles them at 
Quanta Shanghai Manufacturing City using 40,000 workers in China.3, 4 As a consequence, 
                                                 
1 PTAs in this paper include free trade agreements, common markets, customs unions, and single economic 
unions.   
2 ODM or contract manufacturer refers to a company which designs and manufactures a product which is 
eventually branded by another firm.   
3 Dean, Jason and Pui-Wing Tam (2005), ‘The Laptop Trail’, The Wall Street Journal, June 9.   
4 In 2006, Quanta Computer was listed as one of the Global Fortune 500 Enterprises in Fortune Magazine. 
an increase in trade has occurred in the different stages of production – parts and components 
and final assembled goods – that comprise global production networks (Yeats 2001, 
Athukorala and Yamashita 2006, Yamashita 2010). 
 
 Despite these two important developments in the global economy, there has been a 
dearth of studies assessing the role of expanding PTAs in facilitating the integration of 
countries into global and regional production networks. To fill this gap, we systematically 
examine PTAs’ effects on trade flows separated at the vertical production chains into parts 
and components (PCs), and finally assembled goods, in the gravity model framework. We 
consider a total of 268 PTAs including those in force as well as those phased out during the 
period of 1979-2008, in contrast to the majority of available papers which only include a 
handful of all existing PTAs in force.5 By so doing, we are able to assess the ‘spaghetti bowl 
effects’, the increased transaction costs due to complexity in rules of origins (RoOs) and 
inconsistencies created by the overlapping trade agreements. 6  There has been increasing 
evidence to suggest that FTAs are used less for market access than anticipated because the 
costs of complying with RoOs are higher than the benefits of preferential trade especially 
with lower MFN rates (Takahashi and Urata 2008, Hayakawa et al. 2009). In addition, PTAs 
may not have any actual impacts on trade in parts and components since they are essentially 
duty free owing to the ‘tariff escalation’ which makes MFN tariff rates almost negligible or 
significantly lower for parts and components than for final goods in most countries.7 This 
suggests that the previous studies estimating PTAs’ effects on total trade flows may have 
been biased upward due to the aggregation of the data and heterogeneous effects of PTAs. 
 
 This paper finds that PTAs actually have heterogeneous effects on trade in production 
networks in contrast to the commonly found positive effects on total trade flows. In particular, 
                                                                                                                                                        
pxSee http://www.quantatw.com/Quanta/english/Default.as   
5 The only exception is Medvedev (2010) who covered 209 PTAs, including those notified and non-notified to 
the WTO, for the year 2004. However, his focus is on estimating PTA effects on total trade rather than 
production network trade. 
6 These costs include different schedules for phasing out tariffs, different rules of origins (RoOs), exclusions, 
conflicting standards, and differences in rules, other regulations and policies. Indeed, these costs may exert 
adverse effects on production network trade by causing involvement of a larger number of imported parts and 
components from a wide array of countries. The related costs for satisfying RoOs arise from exporting firms’ 
need to prepare all documentations to obtain the certificates of origins (CoOs) which certify that export goods 
are locally produced. For this purpose, downstream firms need to request each part and component supplier to 
issue invoices or contract documents. This creates higher documentation costs for the export of parts and 
components under the RTA schemes. 
7 Except for Thailand and China in the case of the automotive industry. 
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PTAs have no role in facilitating trade in parts and components when PTAs are formed. This 
is consistent with the concerns expressed for overlapping PTAs. At the same time, it is also 
found that PTAs have increased the level of trade in parts and components 6 and 9 years after 
their formation. Perhaps PTAs improve the general trading environment among countries in 
the long run. PTAs play an important role by increasing the level of trade in finally 
assembled goods by 13% to 17% both in the short and long run.  
 
2. The Impact of PTAs on Production Network Trade 
 
This section briefly discusses development of PTA formation and some theoretical 
background to guide the ensuing empirical analysis. We draw information for PTA formation 
from the WTO Regional Trade Agreements Information System (RTA-IS). 8  The RTA-IS 
database is a single, consistent, publicly-available source of information containing all trade 
agreements notified to the WTO to date with a list of partner countries, WTO legal cover, 
date of entry into force and status.9 In addition, we also record those PTAs which ceased after 
their date of entry into force. For instance, the FTA between the Republic of Albania and 
Romania was in force in 2004, but it was terminated since Romania was admitted to the 
European Union in 2007. Lastly, since our focus is on PTAs on trade in merchandise goods, 
our PTAs do not include those agreements with only coverage of service trade under the 
GATS Article V.  
 
 The number of PTAs has significantly increased since the early 1990s (Figure 1).10 
This has been driven by the bilateral agreements signed by the European Union (EU) with 
Central and Eastern European countries, propelled by the accession of ten new members to 
the EU, although the agreements were terminated in 2004 (Vicard 2009). Figure 2 depicts 
average PTA member countries and the average number of PTA-participating countries for 
the period 1980-2007. There are two noteworthy trends. Firstly, the average number of PTA 
countries increased up to 1990 and then decreased to around 10 countries. This large drop in 
the average number was mainly driven by the phase-out of the Third Convention of Lome. 
From 1991 onwards, the average number of PTA member countries has been quite stable with 
                                                 
8 http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx 
9 Notification to the WTO is voluntary, not compulsory. Hence, the database excludes the un-notified PTAs. 
However, since the mid-1990s, it appears that more countries have started reporting to the WTO. 
10 This paper does not make a distinction among PTAs, FTAs (free trade agreements), CUs (customs unions), 
and CMs (common markets).  This is because the first two (PTAs and FTAs) are the dominant forms for existing 
trade agreements and those classified as FTAs in the WTO are essentially preferential agreements (Sally 2008).   
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a secular upward trend. This implies an increasing trend toward bilateral PTA agreements, 
rather than the signing of large-scale multilateral PTA agreements. Secondly, the average 
number of PTAs increased steadily from 1991, from 3 PTAs to 8.8 PTAs on average in 2007. 
This is consistent with the emergence of a spaghetti bowl – a wide spread of overlapping 
trade agreements – which has been at the centre of trade policy discussion in recent years 
(Sally 2008). 
 
 The net effects of PTAs on production network trade depend on the following factors. 
Firstly, trade in final assembled goods consisting of a larger number of imported parts and 
components may not be facilitated by the presence of complex RoOs in overlapping PTAs. 
Under a PTA, countries can maintain their own external tariffs while offering preferential 
(mostly zero) tariffs to the member countries.11 In this setting, RoOs are put in place to 
prevent imports of any products into PTA countries through a country with the lowest tariff 
on the item in question and being re-exported to other countries (the final destinations). If 
RoOs impose stringent criteria for identifying the ‘true’ origins of parts and components used 
in products and cumbersome administrative compliance procedures, PTAs would not be used 
at all (Krishna 2006, Demidova and Krishna 2008).12 The utilisation rates of PTAs can thus 
be influenced by the level of most-favoured-nation (MFN) rates as well as the extent of 
imported parts and components contained in final goods (Menon 2009).13 
 
 Secondly, PTAs may not have any actual impacts on trade in parts and components, 
since they are usually duty free owing to the ‘tariff escalation’, which makes MFN tariff rates 
almost negligible or significantly lower for parts and components than for final goods in most 
countries.14 In other words, margins of preference are practically worthless for this product 
category. All in all, the creation of PTAs may not exert the expected trade enhancement 
effects despite significant resources invested in preparations, negotiations and maintenance. 
This may be manifested clearly when trade flows are distinguished as trade in parts and 
                                                 
11 More precisely, under PTAs except for the customs unions where member countries also offer uniform 
external tariff rates.   
12 There are four types of criteria to determine the origins of goods: (i) the value-added content criterion, (ii) 
change in tariff classification criterion, (iii) the optional criterion allowing a choice of either (i) or (ii), and (iv) 
the dual criterion requiring satisfaction of both (i) and (ii) (Cador et al. 2006).   
13 In fact, evidence suggests lower utilisation of the PTA scheme for market access (Hayakawa et al. 2009; 
Takahashi and Urata 2010,).  For example, only 3.6% of exporting firms are reported to use the Japan-Singapore 
agreement and 5.5% for the Japan-Malaysia agreement. 
14 Except developing countries like Thailand and China where a policy is in place to protect the domestic 
upstream industries.   
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components and as final products. The section below systematically examines this hypothesis 
in the gravity model framework. 
 
3. Gravity Equation and Estimation Issues 
 
To explore the impacts of PTAs on MNE network trade, we estimate the gravity equation 
separately for trade in final goods and for parts and components (PCs). In the empirical 
research of international economics, the gravity equation of bilateral trade flows has been the 
workhorse tool since its first application in Tinbergen (1962). One of the desirable features of 
the gravity equation is that it fits the data very well, typically explaining the variation of the 
bilateral trade flows in a range of 65% to 95% in terms of R squares. This high explanatory 
power has led many applied researchers to apply the gravity equation. The evaluation of 
PTAs’ effects on trade flows using the gravity equation has been one of the most successful 
applications of the gravity equation (e.g., Frankel 1997, Soloaga and Winters 2001, Baier and 
Bergstrand 2007, Fratianni and Oh 2009). 
 
 The fundamental formulation of the gravity equation is that the bilateral trade flows 
are positively related to the size of markets (measured by GDP) and negatively related to the 
geographical distance between two countries. This loosely corresponds to the fact that the 
force of gravity between two entities increases with the products of their mass and decreases 
with distance (Deardorff 1998). Since the simple application of the gravity equation, there 
has been some development in gravity equation techniques.  
 
 In the simplest form, the gravity equation has logs of importer’s and exporter’s GDPs 
and a log of distance (Dist) between trading partners: 
 
ln Xijt = β0 + β1 ln GDPit + β2 ln GDPjt + β3 ln Distij + εij                                                       (1) 
 
where Xij represents bilateral goods exports from exporter i to importer j. In the actual data, 
we use j’s import record of i’s exports because it is generally believed that import records are 
better recorded for tax collection purposes. Subscript t denotes years. The symbol ln before a 
variable denotes the natural logarithm. Equation (1) is usually extended to include the 
following explanatory variables. Most importantly, PTA is a dummy variable, taking unity if 
countries are members of the same PTA and zero otherwise. Note that the PTA dummy has a 
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time dimension because it covers a trade agreement that ceased after 1988, which the initial 
year for the sample period. Cont is a dummy variable, taking unity if two countries share the 
national border and zero otherwise. Lang is a dummy variable taking unity if a language is 
spoken by at least 9% of the population in both countries and zero otherwise. Col is a dummy 
variable taking unity when countries had colonial experience, zero otherwise. Vol is bilateral 
exchange rate volatility between countries i and j. The volatility of nominal exchange rates 
creates risks and uncertainly in international trade transactions. Hence, volatile exchange 
rates may reduce the level of trade between pair countries. We use a widely-used indicator, 
the real exchange rate volatility, which is constructed as the standard deviation of the first-
difference of the monthly natural logarithm of bilateral real exchange rates in the preceding 
five-year period (Rose 2000).15  
 
Despite its long history of successful empirical application, until recently the key 
shortcoming of the gravity equation was the absence of solid theoretical underpinning. 
Anderson (1979) and Bergstrand (1985, 1989) initially addressed this limitation, and their 
works were followed by the Ricardian trade model (Eaton and Kortum 2002), the Heckscher–
Ohlin (Deardorff 1998), and the monopolistic competition models (Helpman and Krugman 
1985, Anderson and van Wincoop 2003). These development derives the following log-linear 
theoretically-consistent gravity equation under the assumption that trade costs are a function 
of geographical distance, linguistic commonality, border contingency, and PTA (see 
algebraic derivation in Anderson and van Wincoop 2003, Baier and Bergstrand 2007).  
 
ln Xij = β0 + β1 ln GDPi + β2 ln GDPj + β3 ln Distij + β4 Contij+ β5 Langij + β6 Colij  
 + β7 PTAij +  β8 Volij + β9 ln Πi + β10 ln Pj + εij.                                                          (2) 
 
 As shown, this theoretically-consistent gravity equation includes multilateral 
resistance terms, ln Πi and ln Pj , accounting for cross-country price variations. Currently, 
there are three techniques available to capture these terms: (i) collection of multi-country 
price indices, (ii) use of custom programming to simultaneously obtain values for 
transportation costs and estimate the structural equation using non-linear least squares, and 
(iii) estimation of the equation using importer and exporter dummies in place of respective 
price indices. We follow the last method because most countries do not report price indices, 
                                                 
15 The nominal exchange rates are drawn from line rf of International Financial Statistics (IFS) and are deflated 
by the monthly consumer price index. 
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and the estimation is relatively easier with a panel data structure. The benchmark estimation 
equation now takes the following form:  
 
ln Xijt = β0 + β3 ln Distij+ β4 Contij+ β5 Langij+ β6 Colij+ β7 PTAijt + β8 Volijt +θit+ δjt +εij.    (3) 
 
Subscript t denotes time (year). The inclusion of importer-year (θ) and exporter-year (δ) 
dummy variables automatically drops importer and exporter GDPs. We estimate equation (3) 
with trade in final goods as the dependent variable and parts and components (PCs) for the 
other. 
 
We also face the potential endogeneity issue of a PTA dummy. If the decision to enter 
into a PTA is determined by the same set of factors influencing bilateral trade between i and j, 
the estimation of equation (3) by OLS estimates will be inconstant and biased (Baier and 
Bergstrand 2004). To avoid this, we employ bilateral fixed (exporter-importer-year) effects to 
take advantage of the panel structure of data following Baier and Bergstrand (2007). Bilateral 
fixed effects isolate the PTA impacts on bilateral trade flows from any time-invariant 
country-pair-specific elements, some of which are related to the decision on the formation of 
PTA and the bilateral international trade. The choice to include bilateral fixed effects is also 
supported by the absence of a reliable instrument variable (IV) approach for the endogeneity 
problem. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) attempt a wide array of economic and political 
potential instrument variables. However, they concluded that finding a suitable IV which 
determines the likelihood of entering PTAs and at the same time is directly unrelated to 
bilateral trade flows is almost an impossible task. 
 
 Based on the discussion, we also estimate the following (preferred) equation which 
accounts for both multilateral resistance and the PTA endogeneity issue:  
                              ln Xijt = β0 + β7 PTAijt + β8 Volijt + θit + δjt +uij + εijt.                         (4) 
In other words, it includes exporter-year, importer-year and the pair-year dummies. Inclusion 
of the pair-dummy removes other time-invariant pair variables such as distance.   
 
 We also consider the lagged PTA effects. While the PTA dummy is constructed based 
on the ‘date of entry into force’ of the agreement, the actual implementation of a PTA 
involves a ‘phase-in’ period, typically over 10 years. For instance, NAFTA had 10-year 
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phase-in period before its full implementation. In addition, the terms of trade created by the 
formation of PTAs tend to have lagged effects on trade volume (Baier and Bergstrand 2007). 
Thus, the entire effects of PTAs on trade flows and how MNEs react to PTAs cannot be fully 
captured in the concurrent year only. We include lagged PTA dummies in three-year intervals 
(i.e., t-3, t-6, and t-9). Baier and Bergstand (2007) found that PTAs can have a prolonged 
effect for as long as 10 years.   
 
 The other estimation issue is zero-valued trade flows. As suggested by many (e.g., 
Melitz 2003), trade flows can be systematically zero rather than pure misreporting. The 
recent firm heterogeneity literature in international economics discovers that firms 
systematically make export market participation decisions, generating observed zero value 
trade. Melitz (2003) and Helpman et al. (2008) suggest that only highly productive firms can 
afford to bear the fixed costs of exporting. The quick ad hoc way of checking the robustness 
of the results is to estimate trade flows by adding one before taking logarithms 
transformations and compare the results from estimating without taking account of zero.16   
 
4. Data 
 
The data on bilateral trade at the 5-digit commodity level are drawn from the UN Comtrade 
database. We use an annual data series for the period of 1988-2008. The initial year is set to 
1988 because this is the first year when UN data in SITC Revision 3 is available. The end 
year is 2008, the year for which the latest data is available. This time span also covers the 
period when PTAs increased dramatically (Figure 1). The data cover 142 countries. Trade 
data distinguished into parts and components and final assembled goods is based on a 
commodity list with 5-digit categorization in the sector of machinery and transport equipment 
sector (SITC 7) (see the Appendix for more details). A prime focus on parts and components 
of machinery and transport equipment products is justified because the available case studies 
                                                 
16 Recently, two approaches were developed to systematically deal with the zero trade issues. The first approach 
proposed in Silva and Tenreyro (2006) is to use the pseudo poisson maximum likelihood (PPML), which is more 
attractive than the least square estimators when the conditional expectation of the logged error term in the log-
form estimation equation is non-zero. The second approach takes into account firm heterogeneity and self-
selection mechanism into export markets by the extended technique of the Heckman two-step estimation 
(Helpman et al. 2008). The downside of PPML is that zero valued trade is treated as in the normal trade values. 
The extended Heckman procedure requires the data on fixed costs for exporting, which are not available to this 
study. Alternatively, the censored regression by the tobit model can be done to control for the truncation of 
sample by zero trade.  However, it has mostly been found that truncation regression does not appreciatively 
change results. 
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suggest global production networks are more prevalent in this sector (e.g., Brown and Linden 
2005). Hence, we can reasonably capture MNE strategies in production network trade by 
focusing on the machinery and transport equipment sector. 
 
Our empirical analysis using the gravity model covers all of the 267 PTAs which are 
listed in Appendix 1. In the gravity literature, a set of PTA dummies is customarily 
constructed in order to capture trade creation and trade diversion effects in addition to the 1-0 
PTA member country dummy variable (Soloaga and Winters 2001, Carrere 2006, Fratianni 
and Oh 2009). While a generic PTA dummy is 1 when both the import and export countries 
belong to the same PTA and zero otherwise, the other PTA dummy is 1 when the import 
country belongs to any PTA and the export country does not, otherwise it is 0. In this way, 
trade creation means positive trade effects of PTAs for intra-PTA members while trade to 
non-PTA members stays constant, whereas trade diversion represents the opposite case.17 In 
the current framework whereby countries are allowed to have more than one PTA, multiple 
PTA dummies per agreement have no usefulness. Using an example from the US-NAFTA 
trade, this problem can be explained as follows. The first dummy by definition means 1 for 
US trade with Canada and Mexico, and zero otherwise. The second dummy is 1 when the US 
imports from countries other than NAFTA members. Now, introduction of a dummy variable 
for the US-Chile PTA in the same manner makes US imports from Chile and US imports 
from extra-NAFTA members indistinguishable (Medvedev 2010). Furthermore, our data set 
covers PTAs since 1988, hence, each of the sample countries has at least one FTA. In fact, a 
second PTA dummy essentially accounts for 93% of all sample countries. This means that the 
second PTA dummy will, if introduced, be completely absorbed in the intercept of 
regressions. Hence, we only use a single PTA dummy in our analysis. Lastly, Distance, 
Contingency, Language, and Colony are drawn from the CEPII database.18 
 
5. Results 
 
Table 1 reports results for estimating PTAs’ effects on trade flows with and without the pair 
dummies, and Table 2 shows the time lagged effect of PTAs with the pair dummies. Separate 
gravity regressions are presented for two different dependent variables - trade in parts and 
components (PCs) and final goods (Final). Exporter-year, importer-year and the pair 
                                                 
17 Soloaga and Winters (2001) also include a third dummy variable in the gravity model.  
18 http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/bdd.htm 
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dummies are included in the estimations but the coefficients are not reported for brevity. The 
conventional gravity variables such as distance and contingency variables show the expected 
sign (regressions (1) and (2) in Table 1). From regression (5) onwards in Table 1, the same 
estimations are repeated by adding one in the dependent variable before taking logarithm. It 
turns out that the estimate coefficient for the PTA dummies does not change much by taking 
into account zero trade flows. Hence, discussions below focus on the results that exclude zero 
trade flows. 
 
 Results in regressions (1) and (2) in Table 1 show that PTAs facilitate trade flows 
connecting the production network. Regressions (1) and (2) suggest that PTAs would 
increase the level of trade flows among member countries by 42% to 62% for both trade in 
parts and component and final goods.19 This finding is consistent with the general positive 
findings of PTA effects on bilateral total trade flows (Baier and Bergstrand 2007). However, 
the results may be driven by the endogenity problem of the PTA dummy. It appears that the 
economic significance of the estimated coefficients on the PTA dummy is too large. 
Regressions (3) and (4) take this into account by including the bilateral pair-dummy. It turns 
out that the PTA dummy no longer supports the above positive finding. In particular, 
regression (3) indicates that the sign of the PTA dummy is negative for trade in parts and 
components, although not statistically significant. However, in regression (4) the PTA 
dummy is still found to be positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. It also 
indicates that PTAs would increase the level of trade in final goods by 13%, which is lower 
than that obtained in regression (2). 
 
 The results have two implications. Firstly, PTAs have heterogeneous effects on trade 
in production networks, supporting our approach of separating trade into parts and 
components and final goods. Secondly and more importantly, PTAs may play no role in 
facilitating trade in parts and components, as compared to trade in final goods in a concurrent 
year. As discussed in section 2, this may suggest that MNEs with production networks may 
not find it attractive to use PTAs due to the complexities and other transaction costs, or 
because of already low MFN rates for this product category. On the other hand, PTAs play an 
important role in facilitating trade in final goods. 
 
                                                 
19 This is computed by the following formula: (exponential (the estimated coefficient)-1)*100.  
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 The results in Table 2 show the lagged effects of PTAs. The top panel (Table 2a) 
shows the results for trade in parts and components in the dependent variable, and the bottom 
panel (Table 2b) is for trade in final goods. Interestingly, the PTA dummy on the level of 
trade in parts and components turns to from negative to positive and statistically significant at 
the 5% level after 6 years of PTA formation (regressions (2), (5) and (7) in Table 2a). It also 
suggests that PTAs would increase the level of trade in parts and components by 6%. Even 
after 9 years, PTA dummies are still found positive and statistically significant at the 5% 
level in regression (3).   
 
 Table 2b reinforces the finding of Table 1. In most of the regressions, PTA dummies 
turn out to be positive and statistically significant at the 1% level by increasing the level of 
trade in final goods by 14% to 17%. Interestingly, such positive effects are pervasive up to 6 
years later but unseen after 9 years. As found in Table 1, the contemporaneous PTA effects 
on trade flows are clearly positive with strong statistical significance. 
 
 All in all, the results in Tables 1 and 2 indicate that PTAs facilitate trade in production 
networks and such positive effects emerge in the long run. These prolonged effects of PTAs 
on trade flows connecting production networks are quite similar to the finding of a well-cited 
paper by Baier and Bergstrand (2007) concerning total trade flows. At the same time, it was 
found that PTA effects on trade in parts and components are unseen in the short run. Perhaps, 
when PTAs are formed, MNEs with extensive production networks opt not to use PTAs 
because of high transaction costs or low-MFN rates available to this product category; 
however, the positive effects of PTAs emerge after 6 years. This may be associated with 
improvements in the general trading environment due to well-established PTAs among 
member countries. It also appears that final goods producers in production networks benefit 
from new PTAs and positive effects are quite perversive for trade in final goods. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The proliferation of overlapping PTAs gives a rise to the additional international business 
transaction costs such as dealing with different schedules for phasing out tariffs, different 
rules of origins (RoOs), and different administrative rules in other regulations across different 
agreements. A growing concern is that PTAs may become major obstacles to an expansion of 
global production network trade, driven by widespread operations of MNEs. In this context, 
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this paper examines the role of PTAs in international trade connecting production networks 
(separately for trade in parts and components and final goods) using the gravity model 
approach, while taking into account the endogenous nature of PTAs for the period 1988-2008 
with over 250 trade agreements in total. 
 
 This paper found that PTAs play an important role in increasing the level of trade in 
final goods both in the short and long run, while the positive PTA effects on trade flows in 
parts and components (PCs) only emerge in the long run. This suggests that the impacts of 
PTAs on trade flows are quite heterogeneous, supporting our approach. The sign of a PTA 
dummy in the concurrent year suggests that PTAs may not have any impact on the level of 
trade in parts and components. This finding partly also reflects concerns expressed for 
overlapping PTAs, especially in a context where production of goods is fragmented with 
different parts of the value chain located in different countries and linked across borders 
through trade in parts and components. In other words, MNEs do not find it beneficial to 
conduct international trade transactions using newly formed PTAs. This may be because 
trade in parts and components is already subject to low MFN rates. However, we found that 
PTAs have a positive impact by raising the level of trade in parts and components in the long 
run (even after 9 years). Perhaps PTAs improve the general trading environment by making it 
more conducive to all sorts of international trade. Hence, this paper did not find strong 
evidence supporting the spaghetti bowl effects of overlapping PTAs which are thought to be 
developing into major obstacles to international business transactions in a context of 
emerging global production networks. Instead, we find that positive PTAs are likely to 
emerge by increasing the level of trade flows 6 and 9 years after the implementation of PTAs 
among member countries. 
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Figure 1: Number of PTAs Notified to the WTO, 1958-2008 
 
 
Notes: The PTA data is based on the WTO Regional Trade Agreements Information System (RTA-IS). The 
figures represent the number of PTAs that entered into force in the given year; the figures are not net counts of 
PTAs.   
 
 
 
Figure 2: The Process of PTA Formation during 1980-2007  
 
Note: This is based on the WTO Regional Trade Agreements Information System (RTA-IS).   
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Table 1: PTA Effects on Trade in Parts and Components (PCs) and Final Goods  
 
  log(X)   Log(X+1) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 PCs Final PCs Finished   PCs Final PCs Final 
PTA 0.353*** 0.486*** -0.042 0.127***  0.877*** 1.030*** -0.079 0.120**
  [0.017] [0.018] [0.029] [0.031]  [0.026] [0.028] [0.049] [0.052] 
Distance (Dist) 
-
1.378*** -1.472***       -1.919*** -2.196***    
  [0.010] [0.011]       [0.015] [0.016]    
Language (Lang) 0.682*** 0.674***       1.075*** 1.243***    
  [0.020] [0.021]       [0.027] [0.029]    
Contingency 
(Cont) 0.317*** 0.334***       0.500*** 0.603***    
  [0.041] [0.041]       [0.076] [0.087]    
Colony (Col) 0.927*** 0.766***       1.563*** 1.630***    
  [0.033] [0.032]       [0.055] [0.062]    
Volatility (Vol) -0.053 -0.454*** 0.031 0.062  1.989*** 1.865*** 0.098 0.145 
  [0.098] [0.099] [0.122] [0.133]   [0.199] [0.220] [0.246] [0.256] 
Exporter * Year YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Importer * Year YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Pair NO NO YES YES  NO NO YES YES 
Obs. 109,463 109,463 109,463 109,463   215,468 215,468 215,468 215,468
R-squared 0.78 0.77 0.28 0.27   0.77 0.76 0.15 0.16 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, 
respectively. ‘Parts’ denotes trade in parts and components as the dependent variable, and ‘final’ denotes 
trade in final assembled goods.   
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Table 2: Lagged PTA Effects on Trade in Parts and Components and Final Goods  
(a) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Bilateral trade in parts and components (PCs)  
PTA(t)    -0.051* -0.043 -0.037 -0.042 -0.04 
    [0.030] [0.029] [0.029] [0.031] [0.031] 
PTA(t-3) 0.009   0.025   -0.001 0.001 
 [0.028]   [0.029]   [0.032] [0.032] 
PTA(t-6)  0.057**   0.057**  0.058** 0.045 
  [0.024]   [0.024]  [0.026] [0.029] 
PTA(t-9)   0.044**   0.041*  0.023 
      [0.022]     [0.022]   [0.024] 
Total Effects  0.057 0.044 -0.051 0.057 0.041 0.058  
Obs. 109,463 109,463 109,463 109,463 109,463 109,463 109,463 109,463 
R-squared 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 
 
 
(b)         
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Bilateral trade in final goods 
PTA(t)    0.084** 0.126*** 0.130*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 
    [0.033] [0.031] [0.032] [0.034] [0.034] 
PTA(t-3) 0.153***   0.127***   0.104*** 0.104*** 
 [0.030]   [0.032]   [0.035] [0.035] 
PTA(t-6)  0.082***   0.082***  0.050* 0.052 
  [0.027]   [0.027]  [0.029] [0.032] 
PTA(t-9)   0.015   0.024  -0.005 
      [0.024]     [0.024]   [0.026] 
Total Effects 0.153 0.082  0.211 0.208 0.13 0.195 0.195 
Obs. 109,463 109,463 109,463 109,463 109,463 109,463 109,463 109,463 
R-squared 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 
 Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, 
respectively. In all regressions, exporter*year, importer*year and pair dummies are included.  PTA (t-1) 
refers to the lagged effect for three years and PTA (t-2) for six years.  Bilateral exchange rates’ volatility 
has been included in all regressions, but the estimated coefficients are not presented since they are not 
statistically significant. Total effects are the sum of the statistically significant PTA coefficient estimates.   
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Appendix 1: A list of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs)  
Name of Agreement Year of Entry into Force 
Year Phased 
Out  
Albania – Bulgaria 2003 2007 
Albania - Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2002 2007 
Albania - Moldova 2004 2007 
Albania - Romania 2004 2007 
Andean Community (CAN) 1988                 1996 
Armenia – Kazakhstan 2001  
Armenia – Moldova 1995  
Armenia - Russian Federation 1993  
ASEAN - Japan 2008  
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 1992  
Asia Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA) (previously, Bangkok 
Agreement)  1976  
Asia Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA) - Accession of China 2002  
Australia - New Zealand (ANZCERTA) 1983  
Australia - New Zealand Free Trade Agreement 1966 1983 
Australia - Papua New Guinea (PATCRA) 1977  
Bulgaria - Estonia 2002 2004 
Bulgaria - Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2000 2007 
Bulgaria - Israel 2002 2007 
Bulgaria - Latvia 2003 2004 
Bulgaria - Lithuania 2002 2004 
Bulgaria - Slovak Republic Free Trade Agreement 1996 1999 
Bulgaria - Slovenia 1997 1999 
Bulgaria - Turkey 1999 2007 
Canada - Chile 1997  
Canada - Costa Rica 2002  
Canada - Israel 1997  
Canada - US Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) 1989 1994 
(Caribbean Community and Common Market) (CARICOM) 1973  
Central American Common Market (CACM) 1961  
Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) 1993 2004 
CEFTA - Accession of Bulgaria 1999 2007 
CEFTA - Accession of Croatia 2003  
CEFTA - Accession of Romania 1997 2007 
CEFTA - Accession of Slovenia 1996 2004 
Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA)2006 2007  
Chile - Costa Rica 2002  
Chile - El Salvador  2002  
Chile  India 2007  
Chile  Japan 2007  
Chile  Mexico 1999  
Common Economic Zone 2004  
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA) 1994  
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Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 1994  
Costa Rica - Mexico 1995  
Croatia - Albania 2003 2007 
Croatia - Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 1997 2007 
Czech Republic - Bulgaria Free Trade Agreement 1996 1999 
Czech Republic - Estonia 1998 2004 
Czech Republic - Israel 1997 2004 
Czech Republic - Latvia 1997 2004 
Czech Republic - Lithuania 1997 2004 
Czech Republic - Romania Free Trade Agreement 1995 1997 
Czech Republic - Slovak Republic Customs Union 1993 2004 
Czech Republic - Slovenia 1994 1995 
Czech Republic - Turkey 1998 2004 
Dominican Republic - Central America - United States Free 
Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) 2006  
East African Community (EAC) 2000  
European Community (EC) - Albania 2006  
EC – Algeria 1976  
EC - Austria Agreement of 1972 1972 1995 
EC – Bulgaria 1993 2007 
EC - Bulgaria Interim Agreement 1993 1995 
EC - CARIFORUM States EPA 2008  
EC - Chile 2003  
EC - Croatia 2002  
EC - Cyprus Association Agreement 1973 2004 
EC - Czech and Slovak Federal Republic Interim Agreement 1992 1995 
EC - Czech Republic Europe Agreement 1995 2004 
EC – Egypt 2004  
EC - Egypt Cooperation Agreement 1978 2004 
EC - Estonia Agreement 1995 2004 
EC - Finland Agreement 1974 1994 
EC - Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia  2001  
EC - Greece Additional Protocol 1975 1981 
EC - Greece Association Agreement 1962 1981 
EC - Hungary Europe Agreement 1994 2004 
EC - Hungary Interim Agreement of 1991 1992 1994 
EC –Iceland 1973  
EC –Israel 2000  
EC - Israel Agreement of 1975 1975 2000 
EC – Jordan 2002  
EC - Jordan Cooperation Agreement 1978 2002 
EC - Latvia Agreement 1995 2004 
EC – Lithuania 1995 2004 
EC - Malta Association Agreement 1971 2004 
EC - Mexico 2000  
EC – Morocco 2000  
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EC - Morocco Cooperation Agreement 1978 2000 
EC – Norway 1973  
EC - Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT) 1971  
EC - Poland Europe Agreement 1994 2004 
EC - Poland Interim Agreement of 1991 1992 1994 
EC - Portugal Interim Agreement 1976 1986 
EC – Romania 1993 2007 
EC - Romania Interim Agreement 1993 1995 
EC - Slovak Republic Europe Agreement 1995 2004 
EC - Slovenia Cooperation Agreement 1993 1997 
EC - Slovenia Interim Agreement 1997 2004 
EC - South Africa 2000  
EC - Spain Agreement of 1970 1970 1986 
EC - Sweden Agreement 1973 1995 
EC - Switzerland - Liechtenstein 1973  
EC - Syria 1977  
EC - Tunisia 1998  
EC - Tunisia Cooperation Agreement 1978 1998 
EC - Turkey 1996  
EC - Turkey Association Agreement of 1973 1974 1996 
EC Treaty 1958  
EC (9) Enlargement 1973  
EC (10) Enlargement 1981  
EC (12) Enlargement 1986  
EC (15) Enlargement 1995  
EC (25) Enlargement 2004  
EC (27) Enlargement 2007  
Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa 
(CEMAC) 1999  
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 1993  
Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) 1992  
European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA)  Bulgaria 1993 2007 
EFTA – Chile 2004  
EFTA – Croatia 2002  
EFTA - Czech Republic Agreement 1992 2004 
EFTA – Czechoslovakia 1992 1993 
EFTA – Egypt 2007  
EFTA - Estonia Free Trade Agreement 1996 2004 
EFTA - Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2001  
EFTA - Hungary Agreement 1993 2004 
EFTA – Israel 1993  
EFTA – Jordan 2002  
EFTA - Korea, Republic of 2006  
EFTA – Latvia 1996 2004 
EFTA – Lithuania 1996 2004 
EFTA – Mexico 2001  
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EFTA – Morocco 1999  
EFTA - Poland Agreement 1993 2004 
EFTA - Romania Free Trade Agreement 1993 2007 
EFTA – SACU 2008  
EFTA – Singapore 2003  
EFTA - Slovak Republic Agreement 1992 2004 
EFTA – Slovenia 1995 2004 
EFTA - Spain Agreement 1980 1986 
EFTA – Tunisia 2005  
EFTA – Turkey 1992  
EFTA (Stockholm Convention) (G) 1960  
EFTA accession of Iceland 1970  
Egypt – Turkey 2007  
El Salvador – Mexico 2001  
Estonia - Latvia – Lithuania 1994 2004 
Estonia - Norway Free Trade Agreement 1992 1996 
Estonia - Sweden Free Trade Agreement 1992 1995 
Estonia - Switzerland Free Trade Agreement 1993 1996 
Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC) 1997  
Finland – Bulgaria 1975 1993 
Finland - Czechoslovakia Agreement 1975 1992 
Finland - Estonia Protocol 1992 1995 
Finland - Hungary Agreement 1975 1993 
Finland - Latvia Protocol 1993 1995 
Finland - Lithuania Protocol 1993 1995 
Finland - Poland Agreement 1978 1993 
Finland-European Free Trade Association (FINEFTA) 1961 1986 
First Convention of Lom? 1976 1981 
Georgia – Armenia 1998  
Georgia – Kazakhstan 1999  
Georgia - Russian Federation 1994  
Global System of Trade Preferences among Developing 
Countries (GSTP) 1989  
Guatemala – Mexico 2001  
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC1) 1981 2003 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC2) 2003  
Honduras - Mexico (G) 2001  
Hungary – Estonia 2001 2004 
Hungary – Israel 1998 2004 
Hungary – Latvia 2000 2004 
Hungary – Lithuania 2000 2004 
Hungary - Slovenia Free Trade Agreement 1995 1995 
Hungary – Turkey 1998 2004 
India – Singapore 2005  
India - Sri Lanka 2001  
Israel – Mexico 2000  
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Japan – Indonesia 2008  
Japan – Malaysia 2006  
Japan – Mexico 2005  
Japan – Philippines 2008  
Japan – Singapore 2002  
Japan – Thailand 2007  
Jordan – Singapore 2005  
Korea, Republic of – Chile 2004  
Korea, Republic of – Singapore 2006  
Kyrgyz Republic – Armenia 1995  
Kyrgyz Republic – Kazakhstan 1995  
Kyrgyz Republic – Moldova 1996  
Kyrgyz Republic - Russian Federation 1993  
Latin American Integration Association (LAIA) 1981  
Latvia - Norway Free Trade Agreement 1992 1996 
Latvia - Sweden Free Trade Agreement 1992 1995 
Latvia - Switzerland Free Trade Agreement 1993 1996 
Lithuania - Norway Free Trade Agreement 1992 1996 
Lithuania - Sweden Free Trade Agreement 1992 1995 
Lithuania - Switzerland Free-Trade Agreement 1993 1996 
Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) 1994  
MERCOSUR 1991  
Mexico – Nicaragua 1998  
Moldova - Bulgaria 2004 2007 
Moldova - Croatia 2004 2007 
Moldova - Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2004 2007 
New Zealand - Singapore 2001  
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 1994  
Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA) 2003  
Pakistan – Malaysia 2008  
Pakistan - Sri Lanka 2005  
Panama – Chile 2008  
Panama - Costa Rica (Central America) 2008  
Panama - El Salvador (Central America) 2003  
Panama – Singapore 2006  
Pan-Arab Free Trade Area (PAFTA) 1998  
Poland – Israel 1998 2004 
Poland – Latvia 1999 2004 
Poland – Lithuania 1997 2004 
Protocol on Trade Negotiations (PTN) 1973  
Romania - Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2004 2007 
Romania – Israel 2001 2007 
Romania – Moldova 1995 2007 
Romania – Turkey 1998 2007 
Second Convention of Lome 1981 1986 
Singapore – Australia 2003  
23 
 
Slovak Republic – Estonia 1998 2004 
Slovak Republic – Israel 1997 2004 
Slovak Republic – Latvia 1997 2004 
Slovak Republic – Lithuania 1997 2004 
Slovak Republic - Romania Free Trade Agreement 1995 1997 
Slovak Republic - Slovenia Free Trade Agreement 1994 1995 
Slovak Republic – Turkey 1998 2004 
Slovenia – Croatia 1998 2004 
Slovenia – Estonia 1997 2004 
Slovenia - Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 1996 2004 
Slovenia – Israel 1998 2004 
Slovenia – Latvia 1996 2004 
Slovenia – Lithuania 1997 2004 
South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) 2006  
South Asian Preferential Trade Arrangement (SAPTA) 1995  
South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation 
Agreement (SPARTECA) 1981  
Southern African Customs Union (SACU) 2004  
Southern African Development Community (SADC) 2000  
Thailand – Australia 2005  
Thailand - New Zealand 2005  
Third Convention of Lome 1986 1991 
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership 2006  
Tripartite Agreement 1968 1993 
Turkey – Albania 2008  
Turkey – Croatia 2003  
Turkey – Estonia 1998 2004 
Turkey - Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2000  
Turkey – Georgia 2008  
Turkey – Israel 1997  
Turkey – Latvia 2000 2004 
Turkey – Lithuania 1998 2004 
Turkey – Morocco 2006  
Turkey – Poland 2000 2004 
Turkey – Slovenia 2000 2004 
Turkey – Syria 2007  
Turkey – Tunisia 2005  
US – Australia 2005  
US – Bahrain 2006  
US – Chile 2004  
US – Israel 1985  
US – Jordan 2001  
US – Morocco 2006  
US – Singapore 2004  
West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) 2000  
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Appendix 2: Trade Data Compilation Method   
 
The trade data in this paper are tabulated using a list of parts and components prepared by 
building on previous studies by Yeats (2001) and Athukorala (2005). Identification of trade in 
parts and components takes a more systematic approach following the commodity classification 
system by the United Nation’s Broad Economic Category (BEC) as detailed below, whereas the 
previous studies including Yeats (2001) and Athukorala (2005) simply identify a list of 
components by merely focusing on the production descriptions. 
 
 The first step is to refer to the classification system of the United Nations’ Broad 
Economic Category (BEC) and select the relevant parts and components items. The BEC 
classification was originally constructed in order to categorize trade data into end-use categories 
that are meaningful within the framework of the System of National Accounts (SNA). The broad 
categories approximate the three basic classes of goods in the SNA: capital, intermediate and 
consumers goods. The BEC includes nineteen basic categories and further subdivisions. Each 
category of the BEC is defined in SITC system. (http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/family2.asp?Cl=10). 
Among seven major categories, industrial supplies (BEC 2), capital goods (BEC 4), and transport 
equipment category (BEC 5) include a sub-category for ‘parts and accessories’. However, not all 
items classified as parts and accessories of BEC 2, 4, and 5 correspond to parts and components 
in a strict sense. Therefore, only the items under the BEC sub-category that also correspond to the 
Standard International Trade Classification’s SITC 7 (machinery and transport equipment) and 
SITC8 (miscellaneous manufacturing) are identified as parts and components in this paper. 
Limiting items to SITC 7 and 8 prevents the inclusions of some components which are traded as 
‘products in their own right’ under specific trade names (e.g., Michelin tyres). The final list 
prepared though this procedure contains a total of 264 items at the 5-digit level of SITC.  
